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BIOETHICAL DECISIONS AND
OPPORTUNITY COSTS
The Honorable Justice Michael D. Kirby, CMG*
In this essay, I propose to analyze the varied ethical and other criteria by
which decisions are made (at both macro and micro levels, as economists
would term it) concerning the distribution of scarce resources available for
health care in the community. In part, my topic is relevant to the amazing
advances of science and technology in our generation. These advances,
whether in the realm of in vitro fertilization, scans, nuclear magnetic
resonance, heart and liver transplants, or renal dialysis, present quandries to
the medical community and to the taxpayer. They are problems that have
not always been clearly faced even though, as I will show, their resolution
sometimes involves literally life and death matters. Changes in social atti-
tudes, partly reflected in the decisions of the courts, have tended to replace
assured and self-confident decisions of the medical profession with a growing
insistence by patients upon their right to know and choose, or, particularly
when vital decisions are made affecting their medical treatment. The central
focus of my subject, then, is the interrelationship between the amazing devel-
opments of medical science and the scarce resources that are available to
spread the fruits of those developments throughout the community to the
many patients who might, however fleetingly, benefit from them.
I. THE SAGE AND MCNAIR-WILSON DILEMMAS
The Case of Sage
Early in 1983, Mr. Derek Sage, then aged forty-two, came under the care
of the renal unit of the Churchill Hospital at Oxford, England. Mr. Sage
had a history of psychiatric illness, hypertension and impaired renal func-
tion. His right kidney did not function and his left kidney was defective. He
lived at Simon House, an Oxford hostel for single homeless men. By March
of 1984, the functioning of his kidneys had become so poor that he required
dialysis. Immediately after this treatment began, however, his mental state
deteriorated. He spent a period of months in a psychiatric hospital, regu-
* President, The Court of Appeal, Supreme Court, Sydney, New South Wales,
Australia.
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larly being brought to the renal unit for dialysis. His behavior became "in-
creasingly disruptive" when he visited the unit. A previously suspected
brain tumor was re-explored and extensive areas of cerebral damage were
discovered. He became demented. His mental age was put at about three
years. He did not respond to simple questions. At times he was violent,
generally uncooperative, dirty, incontinent of urine and feces, unable to take
medication reliably, and unable to adhere to a prescribed diet. He exposed
himself and masturbated while being examined. A great part of his life was
spent under sedation, particularly when he was being dialyzed. His blood
pressure was not properly controlled.
The renal unit staff came slowly but surely to the painful conclusion that
the treatment by dialysis was a "failure." The dialysis sessions were proving
a torment to both the patient and medical staff, as well as affecting the unit's
capacity to deal with other patients.2
When Mr. Sage arrived at the unit for routine dialysis on December 28,
1984, the nurses on duty told the consultant in charge that in their view the
continuation of his treatment was "not in the patient's best interest." The
consultant, it seems, expected "fierce opposition" to any decision to end the
treatment. The decision to end treatment was made, however, and it was
made without consulting the hostel staff or the general practitioner who had
been treating Mr. Sage. "Friends" of Mr. Sage learned of the decision on
December 31, 1984. They were shocked and angry.3 They asserted that
there was a "reasonable quality of life" that could be enjoyed by Mr. Sage,
and they begged the consultant to change his mind. He declined to do so.
Opportunity for review of the decision was referred to the local medical au-
thority. However, the decision had to be made promptly since, without dial-
ysis, the patient would soon die. It was at this stage that the director of the
hostel for homeless men, in which Mr. Sage had spent his life, approached
the President of the British Kidney Patient Association. An appeal was
made, not to the courts (as would probably have occurred in the United
States of America) but to the High Court of Public Opinion. Items began to
appear in the media.4 The British Kidney Patient Association took this un-
likely and seemingly unattractive patient as a symbol and an example of the
scarce resources available in Britain for the treatment of patients requiring
dialysis.- A Labour member of Parliament called for an independent inquiry
1. Brahams, When Is Discontinuation of Dialysis Justified?, 1985 THE LANCET 176 (Jan.
19, 1985), and 8,371 THE TiMES (London) 7 (weekly ed. 1985).
2. See Brahams, supra note 1, at 176.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 177.
5. Id.
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into the issue of allowing some kidney patients to die because doctors be-
lieved that it was "not worth keeping them alive.",6 The Oxfordshire Dis-
trict Health Authority defended the decision. It asserted that the results in
Mr. Sage's case had been reached "purely on medical grounds," and it dis-
missed the claim that his treatment had been cut off after two years because
he was "dirty and difficult." The Authority also dismissed the suggestion
that the County was practicing "passive euthanasia." However, a spokes-
man did concede, in a rather British way,
He will not take his tablets to keep his blood pressure down. Possi-
bly if he had come from a better background and stable home he
would still be treated.",7
It was pointed out that, far from being unduly parsimonious in the provision
of dialysis, Oxford's provision for kidney dialysis was actually higher than
the national average in Britain. Furthermore, the Oxford Authority had a
policy of continuing to treat patients who had a high risk of dying.'
The British Kidney Patients Association was unconvinced. It offered to
pay the four hundred pounds a week necessary for dialysis to keep Mr. Sage
alive. The President of the Association declared:
You cannot say this man's life is more valuable or worthier than
another man's life. Can you imagine what this terrible case must
mean to dyalysis [sic] patients?9
Springing to the defense of the Government, the Under-Secretary of State
for Health, Mr. John Patten, told the House of Commons that the National
Health Service in England provided places for thirty-three people in a mil-
lion to have dialysis, compared with only twenty-four in a million five years
earlier. The Government intended, he said, to increase the provision to forty
places in a million by 1987. However, even at this figure the British level
was among the lowest in Europe. In the United States, nearly ninety places
in a million were provided. Typical figures for other parts of Europe were
Belguim, sixty-one; Spain, sixty-one; West Germany, fifty-six; Austria, fifty-
four; Norway, fifty-four; The Netherlands, forty-six; and France, forty-
four.10
The Case of McNair- Wilson
Contrasting the case of Mr. Sage with the case of Michael McNair-Wilson
6. 8,371 THE TIMES (London) 7 (weekly ed. 1985).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. See also Brahams, End-Stage Renal Failure: The Doctor's Duty and The Patient's
Right, 1984 THE LANCET 386.
10. 62,031 THE TIMES (London) Jan. 9, 1985, at 3, col. 3.
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would be beneficial. He is a man aged fifty-four years who has been the
Conservative member of Parliament for Newbury, not far from Oxford,
since 1974. On November 8, 1984, Mr. McNair-Wilson made a moving
speech to the House of Commons. Among other things, he said:
Since last January, I have been the victim of a rare kidney disease.
Without kidney dialysis, I would be a dead man. The NHS met
my need for treatment without requiring me to show that I had
funds to pay for it. It operated on supply and need, not supply and
demand. That will always remain true of the NHS. That is why it
is such a precious asset to us all.""
The contrast between these two cases could not be more stark. Yet it
merely illustrates the statistical extremes which exist by reference to two
individual cases. I would not want you to think that Mr. Sage was alone in
his predicament. The British Kidney Patient Association maintains that be-
tween two thousand and three thousand people a year die in the United
Kingdom from renal failure and the Association asserts that many of these
deaths are unnecessary. 2 The facilities for dialysis (not to mention renal
transplantation) vary greatly from one area of the country to the other. Of
course, the older one is, the more complications he may have and the less, it
seems, is the chance of obtaining treatment by dialysis. The London Times
made an important point, aggregating the experience of Mr. Sage in an edi-
torial provocatively titled, "Prolonging Low Life." 3
It would be a mistake to think of the case of Mr. Derek Sage, the
kidney dialysis patient, as unique. He is unusual only because his
treatment was stopped after it had been [sic] begun and because
someone else has been found to start it up again. Every year in
Britain several hundred kidney patients die without ever being of-
fered treatment even though they could perfectly well be saved in
the present state of the medical art, and would be saved in almost
any other country in Europe or North America. But usually doc-
tors make a long face and explain to the patients that unfortunately
their case is not suitable for dialysis or transplant. They seldom
add . . . that the patient's unsuitablility may reside principally in
the intractable symptom of having passed his 45th birthday."'14
The inexorable calendar, and the passing of the years, it seems, is the crite-
rion (or at least one of the criteria) for the distribution of scarce resources.
Is this a proper principle? Is it an acceptable approach, when the business of
life and death is concerned with the application of the fundamental eco-
11. The Guardian, Jan. 9, 1985, at 10, col. 3.
12. 1984 THE LANCET 386.
13. 62,031 THE TIMES (London), Jan. 9, 1985, at 11, col. 1.
14. Id.
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nomic problem: the allocation of scarce resources? The students of econom-
ics learn of the "economic problem" in their first lecture. But the
community tarries before acknowledging the application of the economic
problem to matters so intangible as justice or so essential and personal as life
and death. Yet apply it does. And never more so than in our generation.
II. OTHER CASES
The cases for the application of what I will not call the "Sage Principle"
abound in present society. They are rarely acknowledged and little dis-
cussed. Yet they certainly exist.
Liver Transplants
Recently a decision was made to establish a liver transplant center at the
Royal Prince Alfred Hospital in Sydney. Earlier in the year there was much
debate in Australia concerning the cooperation, or lack of it, between the
states of Victoria and Queensland.' 5 But the debate stemmed, in part, from
the competition of various medical teams for the privilege and obligation of
the National Liver Transplant Unit, as this country's resources were unable
to support,' at least initially, more than one.
CT Scanners
These were first introduced in about 1979 when there was a serious
shortage of the scanners as well as the places that could be made available
for use of the equipment. Thus, the only answer was to ration the accessi-
bility to this new medical tool. In theory, these early scanners in Australia
were provided to the major teaching hospitals only-and it was asserted that
they would be available there to provide a service to the surrounding district.
In practice, the rationing which took place frequently depended upon
whether the patient's doctor was attached to the hospital fortunate enough
to have the CT scanner. It is one thing for government health administra-
tors to lay down broad and equitable principles; it is another for the people
on the spot, with control of the facility, to ignore their institutional loyalties
and time honoured ways of doing things. Yet access to the CT scanner is
terribly important and has been so ever since its early availability. Accord-
ing to the British Medical Journal6 there is, as yet, relatively little informa-
tion on the influence of CT on patient management in oncology. However,
reported studies indicate that CT directly alters clinical decisions in fourteen
to thirty percent of patients. The author, extracting this information from
15. The Sydney Morning Herald, Feb. 1, 1985, at 3, col. 1.
16. 1984 BRIT. MED. J. 527.
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United Kingdom statistics, suggests that further evaluation of the CT scan-
ner in the management of cancer is appropriate because of the high cost of
the technology, by inference its rationing and, as yet, its limited availability
to patients. 17
Nuclear Magnetic Resonance
There is now another development which should be mentioned. This is
the advent of Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR). This is a new marvel of
technology which provides for more sensitive examination than even the CT
scanner. It is particularly useful in the diagnosis of benign tumors at the
back of the brain. It can help in differential diagnosis, taking the technology
one step beyond the remarkable advance of the CT. A recent essay in the
Medical Journal ofAustralia under the title "Magnetic Resonance Imaging"
(MRI)-the same thing as NMR--calls attention to the recommendation of
the Australian National Health Technology Advisory Panel to the Federal
Minister of Health in May, 1984, that three MRI units should be promptly
purchased, installed and evaluated in teaching hospitals in Brisbane, Sydney,
and Perth. The total cost of these units would be $9.9 million. However, the
Budget Cabinet in Australia decided in 1984 not to fund the purchase and
evaluation of MRI for the three sites mentioned. This decision was made
despite the support of the Committee, the favor of the Australian Medical
Association and the Royal Australasian College of Radiologists, and the ad-
vocacy of the Federal Minister for Health, Dr. Blewett, and his Depart-
ment. 18 Moreover, a decision was, it seems, made that no fee would be
provided in the medical benefits schedule for private MRI. The consequence
is that we have no MRI (NMR) units in Australia at all. The comment of
the Royal Australasian College of Radiologists was tart:
These decisions are unconscionable and the College cannot con-
done the consequence: the Australian public is not obtaining ac-
cess to the most effective diagnostic services. Patients have already
flown to the United States for MRI investigations."' 9
Resources are scarce. Times are hard. The downturn of the Australian
dollar will not make the purchase of overseas high technology in medicine
any easier. But the case vividly illustrates the economic problem that must
be faced when decisions are made concerning new technology. Increasingly
government officials and the medical literature are calling attention to the
economic implications of the installation of new technology both in coun-
17. Id.
18. Royal Australian College of Radiologists, Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MIR) in
Australia, 142 AUSTRALIA MD. J. 60 (1985).
19. Id.
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tries and in particular hospitals and medical institutions of those countries. 20
One of the problems attracting special attention is the lack of a rational plan
for the distribution of new and advanced technology, so that equipment
which becomes common-place in private offices (even if not supported by
Medicare benefits) is often unavailable in the most prestigious medical cen-
ters of the country because of limitations in public funding decisions, as illus-
trated by the MRI decision in Australia.
I have moved from the micro case of Mr. Sage and Mr. McNair-Wilson to
the macro problem of high tech and national budgetary decisions. But such
macro decisions have their ripple effect. Ultimately, they affect the lives of
ordinary people. For such people, either the tumor will be discovered early
or it will not. Either the dialysis will be made available or it will not. Either
the CT scan will be used or it will not. Either the in vitro fertilization pro-
gram will be available or it will be denied. Either the heart or liver trans-
plant will be ventured or it will not. Cirteria do exist for these decisions.
But all too often they are silent criteria hidden behind what the London
Times has described as the doctor's "long face" and the general assertion
that the patient "is not suitable" for the treatment in question, or that the
procedure that might be so beneficial is "not available" either generally or in
his case.
III. THE LAW
What do lawyers have to contribute to this debate? In the United States
there is a much higher level of provision of intensive care than in Britain
and, seemingly, Australia.2 There is also a much higher level of dialysis.
But not everybody welcomes this provision of expensive care. Somewhat
self-contentedly, the British Medical Journal declared that the difference of
15 percent acute hospital beds in the United States compared to only 1 per-
cent in Britain represented evidence of the "inappropriate use of intensive
care" in the United States.22 Perhaps more relevant to the Sage case, Time
Magazine declared recently:
The only real precedent for federal intervention is Congress's deci-
sion in 1972 to pay 80% of the ruinous cost of kidney transplants
and dialysis for anyone whose kidneys fail. Congress expected to
pay nearly $140 million for 5,000 to 7,000 dialysis patients. The
first year's bill came to $241 million for 10,300 patients. In a dec-
20. See Margulis, White House Lecture, Radiologic Imaging: Changing Costs, Greater
Benefits, 136 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 657 (1981); Evens, ,Economic Implications of a New
Technology Installation: a CT Model 136 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 673 (1981).
21. Jennett, Inappropriate Use of Intensive Care 289 BRIT. MED. J. 6460, 1709 (1984).
22. Id
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ade the number of patients has soared 82,000-including dying
cancer victims and nursing octogenarians-at a cost of $2 billion,
which accounts for 10% of all Medicare payments for
physicians.23
In the United States, at least some of the great care that is taken to pro-
vide the full panoply of medical facilities, whatever the age and quality of life
of the patient, may be attributed to the ever increasing number of medical
malpractice suits.24 While these should not be exaggerated,25 they do repre-
sent a haunting concern that stimulates the medical profession into the pro-
vision of facilities and treatment that might not be afforded in other
countries. As well, there are decisions such as those of Congress. In a sense,
the litigation and the Congressional decision reflect American attitudes to-
ward the individual human life in the United States. Indeed, it is now being
suggested that .there may even be constitutional bases for insisting upon the
right to treatment. 26 I do not pause to analyze these American develop-
ments. We seem further away from a Bill of Rights in this country than
ever. More relevant are decisions and opinions on the law in the United
Kingdom. The Sage case has directed attention to a previously unknown
and unreported decision of the English Court of Appeal in 1980.27
The case involved four people living in Staffordshire. They had gone to
Court urging that the health services were insufficient in their area. They
sought a declaration that the Secretary of State had not fulfilled his duties to
provide a comprehensive health service. The complainants were two elderly
ladies, an elderly man, and a girl who had all been on the waiting list for
orthopedic surgery for some years. The complaint was supported by doctors
in the area, including a consultant surgeon. 28 As far back as 1965, the
surgeon's duties were to organize a comprehensive orthopedic and accident
service for the area, which was an expanding one with a large population.
Plans had been made to upgrade a hospital, which included replacing some
old huts. But the cost estimates for achieving this had risen every year. The
result was that although the project had been approved, it could not be com-
23. Friedrich, One Miracle, Many Doubts, TIME, Dec. 10, 1984, at 72.
24. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1985, at Al, col. 2, discussing the America(n) Medical Asso-
ciation's Third Report by Special Task force on Professional Liability and Insurance.
25. See Kirky, Negligence and The Physician, 14 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. MED. 867 (1984).
26. Appelbaum, Is the Need for Treatment Constitutionally Acceptable as a Basis for Civil
Commitment? J. MED. & HEALTH CARE (1984).
27. See Brahams, Enforcing a Duty to Care for Patients in the NHS, 1984 THE LANCET
1224. The case was also discussed in Rationing of Resources, 290 BRIT. MED. J. 374 (1985); R
v. Secretary of State for Social Services, West Midlands Regional Health Authority, & Bir-
mingham AHA, et al., THE LANCET, Nov. 24, 1984, at 1224.
28. See supra note 27.
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menced within cost limits. The Minister of the day, Dr. David Owen, ex-
plained in 1975 that it was necessary to cut expenditures. His predicament
was not dissimilar to that of Dr. Blewett. The result was that the hospital
could not "command sufficient regional priority to start within the next 10
years." Indeed, by 1978 the proposal for expansion was put off
indefinitely.29
The legal case was based upon the statutory duty of the Secretary of State,
under the English National Health Service Act of 1977, to provide through-
out the country "to such extent as he considers necessary to meet all reason-
able requirements" medical and hospital facilities. It was argued that this
duty, imposed by the parliament, had to be fulfilled.30
Lord Denning, in his judgment dismissing the appeal, said:
It cannot be supposed that the Secretary of State has to provide all
the latest equipment. . . [and] it cannot be supposed that the Sec-
retary of State has to provide all the kidney machines which are
asked for, or for all the new developments, such as heart trans-
plants, in every case where people would benefit from them.3"
Lord Bridge, during argument, said that if the patient's contention was
right, a startling conclusion emerged; namely, that the Ministers of State had
been "in flagrant breach of duty under the statute for ten years and that this
had gone (rather surprisingly) unnoticed by parliament." He added,
I feel extremely sorry for the particular applicants in this case, who
have had to wait a long time, not being emergency cases, for neces-
sary surgery. They share that misfortune with thousands up and
down the country. I only hope that they have not been encouraged
to think that these proceedings offered any real prospect that this
court could enhance the standards of the NHS, because any such
encouragement would be based upon manifest illusion.3 2
The legal correspondent for the Lancet commented:
It was perhaps unrealistic to hope that the courts could intervene
in what must be seen as a political judgment of priorities. Had
they done so, the government could easily have amended the Act,
although it would have forced a debate in parliament. But what of
it? The position has remained the same under successive govern-
ments faced with the Mr. Micawber syndrome, and the misery of




32. See Brahams, supra note 27, at 1224.
33. Id. at 1225.
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The Economist took the occasion of its analysis of this problem to point
out the necessity of rationing and queuing in any medical health service.
The consequence can be under-treatment of the inarticulate. It is by ration-
ing against the inarticulate that Britain's National Health Service now unfor-
tunately works, and almost every saintly Briton assumes that his NHS is the
envy of the world. That assumption drives intelligent inquiring foreigners
berserk. One party, a visiting American Congressman, found a young Eng-
lish woman who had waited eight years after an accident for plastic surgery
to remove facial scars that had by then blighted most of her youth. Asked
sympathetically for her comments on the NHS, "Oh, its a wonderful system
we have in Britain," she replied. "You know our medical care is all free.",34
IV. THE TRIAGE AT WORK
At some time prior to the wars of Napoleon it became a common practice
at the battle front to have a Triage Master. His was the duty to stand in
front of the first field hospitals. It was he who rejected some casualties as
insufficiently wounded to require treatment. Others, he decided, needed a
poultice. These he sent to the left. He rejected others with a belly wound as
incapable of being saved. By his fiat these were sent to the dying sheds.
They were sometimes admitted to a great tent where the surgeons could
concentrate their limited resources before anaesthesia. 3" A Canadian judge
told the recent World Congress on Law and Medicine in New Delhi:
No matter how it is done, triage is a cruel procedure, perhaps an
immoral one, but it is generally recognized as necessary and I sug-
gest inescapable. Whenever the State is involved one of the forces
which must influence the politicians is money . . . and I tell you
that in an undisguised and very direct way our politicians, by their
laws, are going to ultimately decide upon all our rights both legal
and medical: they do now, will continue and I think must engage
in the massive practice of triage, which in our case is not applicable
only to the wounded nigh to death on the battle field, but also to
those in peril of their life, because they are accused of crime in
society which, if it finds them guilty, will demand their death.36
With perfect equality, this judge pointed to the triage in the law as well as
in medicine. It operates by delay, queuing or rationing, or by classification.
34. See generally Macrae, Health Care International, 291 ECONOMIST 17, 19 (April 28,
1984); American Survey: A Time for Tourniquet on Medical Costs, 294 EONOMIST 19, 20
(Feb. 2, 1985).
35. Smith, Triage: Endgame Realities, 1 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 143 (1985).
36. Locke, Law, Medicine and the Ultimate Power of Decision, Remarks before The World
Congress on Law and Medicine, New Delhi, India (Feb. 22, 1985).
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It is the operation in the matters of justice and of life and death of the eco-
nomic problem. A decision to provide one service represents a decision to
deny another. The loss of the other services represents the opportunity cost.
This decision is rarely faced squarely and candidly. Only now are we begin-
ning to face openly and to debate the consequences of the failure to provide
legal services for people in the courts and the failure to provide high tech
diagnostic aids and other facilities to people in the hospital ward.
A Modern Privilege
One judge, who was both a physician and lawyer (Sir Roger Ormrod) has
suggested that the considerations of cost-benefit in individual medical deci-
sions "cannot be completely ignored.",
37
In reaching the present state of practice [on life support systems]
two significant steps were taken implicitly by the medical profes-
sion, and it is as well to make them explicit. It recognised that it is
concerned with something more than the maintenance of life in the
sense of cellular chemistry, and so implicitly accepted the concept
of "quality of life' from which it has, in the past, always fought
shy, for obvious reasons. It also has implicitly accepted that con-
siderations of cost-benefit cannot be completely ignored. In the
last few years both phrases have begun to appear in print with in-
creasing frequency as the profession gradually comes to terms with
them. Ten or fifteen years ago, mere mention of either was enough
to precipitate an emotional response from most doctors. Now they
are explicit and can be discussed and debated rationally-an im-
portant advance from many points of view.38
According to Sir Roger Ormrod this advance is desirable and it empha-
sizes the great privilege of rational choice which is open to modern man.
But the comments on the recent Sage case in England, at least in the popular
journals, are not as sure. The Times editorial pointed out that there was "no
safe dividing line between medical and social criteria." Indeed, it suggested
that a medical practitioner who sought strictly to exclude from consideration
the feelings of the children of a patient with a young family, for instance,
would only be guilty of another sort of cruelty. 9 The Guardian newspaper,
in its editorial, contrasted the treatment of Mr. Sage and Mr. McNair-Wil-
son by observing:
Did any of the doctors who saved Mr. McNair-Wilson ever stop to
think whether they were improving the quality of his life by treat-
37. Ormrod, A Lawyer Looks at Medical Ethics 46 MEDIco L. J. 18 (1978).
38. Id. at 28.
39. 62,031 THE TIMES (London), Jan. 9, 1985, at 11, col. 1.
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ing him? Did they reflect on whether it might be officious of them
to equip him to return to the government backbenchers? Of
course, they didn't and of course, they were right not to do so.
They treated Mr. McNair-Wilson because he needed to be treated,
and for exactly the same reason that they treated Mr. Sage. It is
simply impossible that doctors should choose which of us is more
worthy of medical treatment because of the way that we live.'
The debates continue to rage in the medical and popular literature about
these cases. At one level the discussion is addressed to whether the discon-
tinuation of dialysis was justified in the particular case of Mr. Sage.4 ' At
another level consideration has been given to the legal duty of the doctor to
provide care for his patient and even the risk that the doctor who tells a
patient that his condition is "untreatable," knowing that it could be treated if
only there were more facilities, may be committing a crime, possibly conspir-
acy to attempt the manslaughter of the patient.4 2 I do not enter this debate
or the debate about the civil rights of a patient denied full and frank disclo-
sure by his treating physician. It is important, however, to call attention to
the latest decision of the House of Lords on February 21, 1985, which sug-
gests that doctors have a legal duty to inform patients of "substantial risks"
involved in medical treatment, though not every risk however small.43 By
inference the extent of the patient's right to know available diagnostic and
treating procedures appears to have been extended by this important new
decision. Although English law, which remains most influential in this
country, has not gone as far as the doctrines of "informed consent" in the
United States,44 the decision of the House of Lords appears to have edged it
gently in the same direction.
CONLUSIONS
What conclusions should be drawn from this discussion of budget choices
and bedside decisions? A number can, I suggest, be mentioned.
Duty to Patient
First, the guiding principle must always be the medical practitioner's duty
to the patient and respect for the patient's autonomy as an individual human
40. The Guardian, Jan. 9, 1985, at 10, col. 4.
41. See Brahams, supra note 1, at 176.
42. See Brahams, supra note 9, at 386.
43. See discussion of Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal Hospital & Maudesley Hospital Health
Authority, in THE TIMES (London), Feb. 22, 1985, at 28, col. 1. See also Grubb, A Survey of
Medical Malpractice Law in England: Crisis? What Crisis, I J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
75 (1985).
44. G. SMITH, GENETICS, ETHICS AND THE LAW 3 (1981).
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being. This is the guiding principle that has activated the House of Lords in
its most recent decision.45 It actuates most of the legal decisions on medical
treatment. It is relevant in this area because of the possibility that advances
in medical technology may present facilities that would be especially useful
in a particular case but which are not available. Endless speculation and the
exclusion of every possible diagnosis are not required of the reasonably care-
ful medical practitioner. But if a decision were reasonably made that a par-
ticular facility ought to be available to the patient, it does not seem
appropriate to judge the provision of that facility or its denial by reference to
an evaluation of economic considerations and an assessment of the patient's
likely quality of life, without involving the patient or his representatives in
that decision.
The responsibility of decision
Ultimately, someone must take responsibility for the decisions that are
made. Desirably, in our form of political government, the macro decisions
should be made by elected representatives. Thus, in Australia, the provision
(or non-provision) of nuclear magnetic resonance or the expenditure of large
sums on expensive programmes such as in vitro fertilisation or heart and
liver transplant units, are made by Ministers and governments (and ulti-
mately parliaments) advised by expert committees. It is desirable that the
ultimate responsibility should be identified in order that there be accounta-
bility. The increasing propensity to take the exercise of ministerial discre-
tions to the courts, and especially to the Federal Court of Australia, under
the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act of 1977 may mean that in
the future, in this country, the exercise of discretion by Ministers to provide
funds (or not to provide funds) will be scrutinized in the courts, at least to
the extent of ensuring that only relevant considerations have been taken into
account and that no irrelevant considerations have infected the ministerial
decision."
The privilege of choice
At least now, as Lord Justice Ormrod has said, these issues are out in the
open. No longer is the long face (of "the Thunderer") or a vague generality
sufficient. Yet, the opening up of the criteria for rationing and queuing ex-
pensive medical facilities brings its own problems. In the past, there was a
tendency simply to accept the sad decision because of trust in the judgment
45. See supra note 43.
46. Cf Beaumont in Santa Sabine College v. Ryan, Minister for Education for the Com-
monwealth of Australia, No. - slip. op. at - (Federal Court of Australia, Jan. 17, 1985).
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and decency of the individual practitioner involved. In the future it is un-
likely that such unquestioning acceptance will survive. Instead, it is likely
that patients and their representative groups, such as the Kidney Associa-
tion, will bring out into the open the uncomfortable fact that an arbitrary
birth date may have been chosen or some idiosyncratic judgment of "quality
of life" has been made that excludes the dirty and unpleasant while provid-
ing facilities to the articulate, influential, and clean. At the very least, the
value of the Sage case is to force us to confront squarely the cruel necessity
of rationing and the obligation to identify in the future, more clearly than we
have in the past, the criteria by which that rationing is to take place in indi-
vidual cases. To consider in general terms the need to economize, the eco-
nomic problem and the modern triage may be intellectually acceptable. But
when its impact is upon a loved one, or even (as in Mr. Sage's case) someone
not particularly loved but at least defended by a few champions, the decision
is harder to make. Someone must make the decision. Criteria must exist.
Perhaps we can solve the dialysis problem. But every year will bring more
and more expensive technology which simply cannot be provided in Bourke
and Wilcania or even, as in the case of NMR, anywhere in Australia. Gov-
ernments are elected to make these decisions at the national level. But doc-
tors are not elected. They are not even given special training in these
matters. They may no longer resort to the sheet anchor of a commonly
accepted religion or generally accepted community ethics. To what, then,
will they resort as their criteria for decision making? If it is to be "quality of
life," that expression must be given greater clarity and articulation.47 For in
its generality may lurk the danger of prejudice, bias, or even unconscious
antipathy and non-identification with a patient like Mr. Sage.
Deserving the privilege
In part, the economic problem can be addressed by improving our effi-
ciency in the distribution of medical resources. In part, we must always test
ourselves (as the British have now begun to do in the matter of dialysis) by
comparing our expenditures with countries we would regard as similar in
ethical and professional standards and economic capacity. In part, we must
engage the attention of the professional colleges and of the medical educa-
tors so that such decisions are made in a structured and conceptually accept-
able way and not by rude rules of thumb merely asserted, the details of
which are hidden from the patient. In secrecy lies obfuscation of decision-
making. If the apportionments are brought out into the open, political and
47. See generally Smith, Quality of Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliative or Apotheosis?, 63
NEB. L. REV. 709 (1984).
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professional pressure may be applied to have them changed: to increase re-
sources or to reapportion community expenditure for use on prevention
rather than treatment ex post. We may wish to introduce procedures so that
decisions are not idiosyncratic but are shared by medical teams and made
according to previously stated and clearly available criteria which ensure
equality of treatment and diminish the risk of disadvantaging the poor and
the inarticulate in the provision of health care. Enough has been said to
show that the great medical issues that face Australia in the decade ahead
will include the rational and principled apportionment of the scarce re-
sources available for the medical treatment of precious individuals. On a
national level important decisions will be made, as they should be, ultimately
by politicians. At the bedside, important decisions will continue to be made
by medical practitioners.
The appeal of this essay is for greater clarity and openness in both the
principles and procedures of decisionmaking, and a more precise recognition
by all of us of the hard choices, national and individual, that daily must be
made. Lord Justice Ormrod has delcared that this is a great privilege and an
opportunity that is now available to us. But it is only so if we deserve to
have it. And we only deserve to have it if we make our decisions by refer-
ence to ethical principles that we have bothered to think about, and to iden-
tify and constantly rescrutinize and test, against changing community
standards.
There is nothing especially new in any of this, for in his DOCTORS DI-
LEMMA, George Bernard Shaw-you will recollect-presented Dr. Sir
Colenso Rigeon. Sir Colenso had a new wonder drug, and his dilemma was:
which of his patients, so deserving, should get it.4 The arbitrary triage of a
youthful birthdate, or one based upon background, wealth, education or so-
cial station are, at the least, suspect. New rules must be found for the Triage
Master of today. Now that we know that he exists, this is the beginning of
wisdom.4 9
48. G.B. SHAW, DOCTOR'S DILEMMA 116 (1911).
49. See supra note 36.
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